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I.

WHY USE A NEW BOOK?

A recent survey of Property syllabi suggests that property law is
losing ground in law school curricula.' According to the survey's
authors, a "notable trend appears to be a reduction in the number of
hours allocated to Property."2 A generation ago, most schools gave
Property six hours in the first-year curriculum; today it appears that
less than half do.3 Our colleagues, it seems, are not convinced of the
central importance of the topic we teach, perhaps because we have not
succeeded in making clear to them, or to ourselves, just what it is.
There is no canon in first-year Property, except perhaps that provided
by the widespread use of Dukeminier and Krier, the leading "brand
name" in property texts and the single most popular casebook on any
topic in American law schools.' But even when using Dukeminier and
Krier, the first-year Property teacher whose course lasts only one
semester (and that is apparently a growing category) must choose those
pieces of the traditional property course she (a) cannot do without and
(b) can fit into fourteen weeks. Teaching Property, an art like any
other teaching, has become not painting, but collage.

* Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
1. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall & Jerome M. Organ, The Contemporary Property Law Course:
A Study of Syllabi, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 205 (1997).
2. Id. at 206.

3. Id.
4. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (4th ed. 1998).
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The result of all these decisions to cut or not to cut is that the
elements of the traditional Property course most often taught, estates
in land and future interests,' are those probably least used in practice.
Perhaps those elements retain their place in the syllabus from a sense
that they present the first-year student with the law's past, with those
magic syllables that whisk us into the realm of the law: possibility of
reverter, right of reentry, fee tail, springing executory interest, and
we're offl Our rationale is not a visit to Narnia or the Land of
Cockaigne, of course, but a sentence or two about the disciplined
framework of the estates system or the mental acuity won by close
attention to future interest problems. A more generous explanation is
that some grounding in the estate system is necessary in order to get
to the topics that students are likely to see in their practice, topics like
concurrent interests and landlord-tenant law. And yet a third
explanation, and one I intend to pursue further down in this piece, is
that they represent all that is left of Property's unique subject concerns.
This unsatisfactory situation-lack of agreement on the basic
substance of a Property course, dependence upon the most archaic
segments of property law, our colleagues' skepticism-means that
Property professors may well be intrigued by a text that promises to
"reestablish[] the primacy of property law in the curriculum." 6 And
for those less ambitious and perhaps a bit burned out, the casebook
authors also pledge to "breathe[] new life into the basic property
course." 7 Altogether, an attractive proposition.
It certainly was to me when I was faced with transforming a sixcredit two-semester course into a four-credit spring semester one. I
had used Dukeminier and Krier for some five years previous and
thought the task of condensing and cutting would be made easier with
a new textbook, one that did not necessarily contain the cases to whose
teaching I had become accustomed and even attached. So, in Spring
1998, I adopted a casebook new to me and new to the world, Dwyer
and Menell's Property Law and Policy,' which had just been published.
My choice was based on a page-turning perusal and the authors'
preface.

5. All forty respondents to Kwall and Organ's request for Property syllabi covered estates
in land and future interests, as well as concurrent interests. Everyone covered adverse possession
and servitudes; 90% covered landlord-tenant; 75% covered real estate transactions and regulation
of land use. Kwall & Organ, supra note 1, at 207-08.
6. JOHN DWYER & PETER MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, at v (1998).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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In the preface, the authors reject the "heavy emphasis of
traditional property texts on common law" as "both anachronistic and
poorly suited to preparing students." 9 They suggest that the resurrection of the Property course (and professor) can be accomplished
through an epistemologic apparatus, "comparative institutional
analysis."'" Property, they say, is not rights in land or other resources, but "a triadic relation among institutions, resources and culture.""
Thus, property law should no longer be taught as "a disparate set of
doctrinal areas loosely tied together by their relationship to land.12
Instead of focusing on land, the casebook authors suggest looking at
resources generally through a "comparative analysis of the major
institutions-legal, social, market, and political-governing [them]."' 3
They suggest a shift in pedagogic focus from the common law to the
more practical and realistic analysis of statutes, regulations, and a
"range of legal, market, and political institutions.' 4
The authors' claim is to a unique recognition of (1) "the interplay
of common law, statutory and constitutional regimes,"(2) "the growing
significance of non-land forms of property,"(3) "the emergence of
environmental values," and (4) "the central importance of public policy
analysis to resolution of complex social problems."' 5 This is certainly
an approach that can benefit the first-year Property teacher whose
course is set in a semester that may also contain courses focusing on
positive law, like Civil Procedure, Administrative Law, Constitutional
Law, or Criminal Procedure, as mine does.
II.

WHAT THIS BOOK Is ABOUT

The chapters of the book are divided by their focus on rules and
institutions, social norms and institutions, and on institutions
themselves-the market, the political structure-in turn, rather than,
as is more typical, some particular aspect of the law of property, e.g.,
landlord-tenant, estates in land, covenants, easements and servitudes.
Chapter I, the introductory chapter, described in the preface as
introducing the "basic themes of the book,"' 6 begins with philosophi-

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id. at vi.
DWYER & MENELL, supra note 6, at v.
Id. at v.
Id. at vi.
Id.at v.
Id. at vi.
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cal perspectives on property. I am not sure why these are "basic
themes," given the reliance upon the "triadic relation" of institutions,
resources and culture, which is earlier said to be the focus of inquiry.' 7 It may be that philosophical perspectives stand in for culture in
this section, for the next two sections of the chapter deal with
institutions and resources. But it is not clear how an introduction to
natural rights, personhood, distributive justice and utilitarian theories
of property is a guide to varied cultural perspectives on property, since
all the excerpts in that section are from post-Enlightenment English or
American writers who share commitments, of varying intensity, to the
market.' 8
The next section of the basic themes chapter uses the work of
William Cronon 19 to illustrate differing institutional approaches to
Property. This seems to me to focus more specifically on culture,
since Cronon's work explicitly contrasts the conceptions of property
held by 16th and 17th century Native Americans and the English
religious dissidents who settled among them. Nonetheless, it is labeled
as an examination of "institutions to manage and allocate resources."" °
The third section, which compares customary rules of the whaling,
oyster and lobster fisheries for examples of property regimes that vary
based upon the nature of the resource in which rights are assigned,
might also be considered an examination of institutions." I confess
then to some confusion as to the distinctions among culture, resources
and institutions as they are used to give structure to this casebook. I
am also unclear as to the respect in which this amounts to a "comparative" approach as the text's title suggests. It may be that an integrated
teacher's manual, unavailable to me during the semester I used the
newly-published book, provides further explanation of a topic which
remained opaque to me throughout the semester.
The first chapter contains no cases and it is not until the second
chapter on background legal rules and institutions, almost seventy
pages into the text, that one reaches the first case, Johnson v.
M'Intosh.22 Thus, the teacher must make a decision quite rapidly as

17. Id.
18. They are: John Locke on natural rights; Margaret Radin on personhood; James Q.
Wilson on distributive justice (!); and Richard Posner and Garrett Hardin on utilitarianism. See
DWYER & MENELL, supra note 6, at 1-63.
19. Id. at 21-47 (quoting WILLIAM CRONIN, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS,
COLONISTS AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 37-49, 53-75, 128-31 (1983)).

20. Id. at xix.
21. Id. at 56-63.
22. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). By contrast, in DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4,
where that case is also first, it is reached on the third page.
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to how to proceed with the course. One may postpone case reading
until after the first or second week of the semester, and begin with a
fairly abstract level of discussion that does not directly utilize legal
discourse, an approach which may arouse some negative student
reaction. On the other hand, one could dispense with the first chapter
and plunge immediately into the cases, thereby giving up the opportunity to make the book's framework, and the philosophical and
economic underpinnings of private property, apparent at the beginning.
I consider this rather a Hobson's choice. Introducing philosophical and cultural perspectives on property are part of what makes the
course interesting and thus so enjoyable to teach. When students
recognize the philosophical and economic baggage attached to some
naive preconceptions and presumptions about the nature of property,
they must examine previously unexamined, perhaps even unconscious,
assumptions they have held about the social and the physical world.
Bringing these to light, making their application concrete, and
considering the alternatives, are the wonderful shared task of student
and teacher. So, it is hard to give up the explicit examination of
perspectives. But on the other hand, without some cases to reference,
it is difficult to move perspectives from abstraction to particularity.
Perhaps some suggestion as to how to integrate the first chapter's
readings into a syllabus that began with the second chapter would be
a useful addition to a teacher's manual.
Chapter II is perhaps the most traditional of the chapters, for it
concentrates on background legal rules, largely in terms of the common
law. In this chapter are the sections that are the usual fodder of the
first half of a Property course: how property is acquired, including
discovery and conquest; adverse possession; and capture from the
common pool. (The introductory staple of the traditional Property
course-finders-is omitted entirely, which I rather regret, since the
old chestnut, Armory v. Delamirie,23 is fun to teach.) Next come
estates in land and future interests; concurrent interests and marital
property; then trespass, nuisance and takings; and finally, closing out
this big chapter (about a third of the whole book) is real estate
transactions. Aside from landlord-tenant and covenants, easements and
servitudes, this is pretty much the whole of the corpus of first-year
Property.
This chapter teaches well, on the whole. I was particularly
pleased with the two cases in the water subsection of the section called

23. 1 Strange 505 (K.B. 1722).
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"Acquisition of Other Resources. '24 The authors have found a pair
of cases with virtually identical facts that come out in precisely
opposite ways. 21 Students discover that water is valued very differently as a resource in Illinois and Colorado, the two states where the
cases are decided, and that it is this contextualization of the resource
in its natural world which accounts for the cases' opposed outcomes.
I would have liked to see more pairings of this kind in the text as a
whole, an approach which would, I think, be consonant with the stated
purpose of giving more attention to environmental issues than is usual
in the standard property casebook.
The book's teaching approach is well-displayed in the second
chapter. There is a fair amount of text and discussion, some statutory
material showing how the common law is codified and modified by
statute, and a problem for students to think through at the end of each
subsection. On the other hand, there is very little of the traditional
fodder for in-class discussion. The entire section on estates in land
and future interests has only four cases in toto.2 6 Only four of the
forty-seven separate sections of this chapter contain more than one
case. The more typical section has text, a single case, and a problem,
or no case at all and simply text and a problem. And because there is
generally only one case per section, cases rarely illustrate problems and
tensions in the rule, but simply set forth the rule itself, the reasoning
one must follow to apply the rule to facts, or the historical course by
which the rule has been reached. Thus, even where there are cases in
the text, they are not often the kinds of cases that encourage the
dialogic inquiry that introduces first-year students to the nature of legal
reasoning.
Teaching without many cases exposing the path of legal reasoning
is problematic. 27 The intention of the authors seems to be that
discussion of case-based problems at the end of most sections should
replace the more traditional textual discussion. But I found it difficult
to use the problems in class to achieve the kind of dialogic interplay
that case discussion usually evokes. The problems seemed more
generally suited to exam questions or out-of-class written exercises than
to in-class discussion and I often found myself lecturing, which I do
not like. In short, I did not like teaching without cases and my

24. DWYER & MENELL, supra note 6, at 94-130.
25. CompareEvans v. Merriweather, 4 Il1. 492 (1842), with Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch
Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
26. DWYER & MENELL, supra note 6, at 133-69.
27. By contrast to this book's 65 cases, DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 4, with
essentially the same coverage, contains 111 cases.
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students did not like learning without cases; indeed, it was a matter
mentioned in some evaluations.28
It may be that the philosophy of this text demands a de-emphasis
on cases, replaced by statutory and regulatory materials. But I wonder
if it is not possible to integrate cases and text in such a way that
students get the benefit of the traditional in-class, case-based dialogue
that we think so important for the first year, while also learning that
not all cases rely upon the common law, but that interpretation of
positive law is also a characteristic of lawyerly thinking. It is not clear
to me that the institutionalist approach chosen by the authors is at
fault; I am not sure that a property textbook which emphasizes statute
and regulation more than is usual need necessarily skimp on cases. For
example, Moore incorporates a range of judicial discussion of the
applicability of both common law and statute which could provide
students with a good basis for comparing the two.29 Similarly,
International News Service v. Associated Press,3" with its separate
opinions by Justices Peckham, Holmes and Brandeis, is a wonderful
case for discussing the common law approach to new legal issues, as
opposed to the Realist arguments in favor of statutory resolution. That
case, like Moore, is not in this casebook
After the first chapter on culture/philosophy/resources and the
large second chapter on background legal rules, the authors go on to
fill in the other point of their notional triangle, social institutions, in
three additional separate chapters. Thus, Chapter III deals with social
norms, Chapter IV with markets, and Chapter V with political
institutions. The section on social norms uses water rights, intellectual
property rights and law-firm partnership rights as illustrative of the
way in which the resolution of property conflicts may depend upon the
cultural contexts in which they occur. It relies largely on textual
material, with only two cases in the whole chapter. Chapter IV uses
landlord-tenant and nonpossessory real interests, the latter both
common law and contractual, 3 as grist for a discussion of market
institutions. The chapter on political institutions examines zoning,

Not very many cases, but lots of
28. E.g., "I would complain a little about the text ....
text"; "Casebook-not enough cases to illustrate the material"; "I think the handouts w/pictures
[from Dukeminier & Krier] may be a more interesting book." Spring 1998 Evaluations, Halper
Property Course, Washington & Lee University School of Law (on file with the author).
29. See Moore v. Regents of The University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
(discussing the applicability of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4, 7150 (West 1990)).
30. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
31. On the one hand, covenants, easements, and servitudes, and on the other, common
interest communities and homeowner associations.
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police power, and land use planning generally. I find these latter
topics rather awkwardly separated from the sections on nuisance and
takings which appear in the second chapter on legal institutions.
III.

WHY A NEW BOOK DOESN'T HELP

After teaching from the book for one semester, I am not yet
convinced that revivifying Property in the first-year curriculum is a
matter of a comparative institutionalist approach, although I appreciate
the impetus that leads scholars to choose it. Instead, I think that if we
are to convince our colleagues that Property should, as Dwyer and
Menell urge, regain its "primacy . . .in the curriculum," 32 it must be
because what students learn in Property is, first of all, not learned
elsewhere, and second, necessary to what is learned elsewhere. At one
time, everyone believed that; today they do not. Why?
In other areas of the law, some pedagogic problems have come
from the inability of faculty to convince students that the law, rather
than politics, is actually at work. A good example is the Constitutional
Law course which can no longer be said to be free in any of its parts
from fairly severe rupture along political lines, a rupture which hardly
bothers any more to masquerade as doctrinal difference. 3 But in
regard to Property, while political issues certainly make doctrine, they
are not in its forefront, not ineluctable and intractable, the way
abortion, affirmative action and workplace conduct, just for example,
are. Rather, I think the problem with teaching Property is the same
as the problem with property law itself. Property, as we learned from
the Realists,34 has become dephysicalized and abstracted from the
world of sensuous apprehension. Property is not the thing, but it is
value, and value, as Holmes told us, is a social creation. 3' But value

32.

DWYER & MENELL, supra note 6, at v.

33. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (where
Justice Scalia in dissent is in the position of supporting what he himself describes as a
"Kulturkampf').
34. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). There he
adverts to the dangers of calling anything with value property: "[You] make it seem like land."
Id. at 342. And he goes on to warn that "you cannot give it [a valuable business] definiteness of
contour by calling it a thing. It is a course of conduct." Id. See also Robert L. Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Morris R.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (characterizing property as
"sovereign power compelling service and obedience .
[D]ominion over things is also
imperium over our fellow human beings").
35. Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246-48 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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is not just the preserve of Property teachers, but is also the subject of
Contracts and of Torts in the first-year curriculum.
Those of us who teach Moore,36 for example, find ourselves
discussing whether there was an implied contract between Moore and
his doctors, and evaluating the expectations of the parties as to the use
of cells found in tissue taken from Moore's body. And we have to pull
back and say that what we want to focus on is the property issues in
the case, not the contract issues. But how real is that distinction?
How real is that distinction when we teach cases like Kendall v. Ernst
Pestana37 that interpret the expectations of parties to a landlord-tenant
contract as to whether the landlord's consent to allow a sublet may be
withheld unreasonably? 8 Of course, one of the themes of many
Property courses is the way in which contracts, like leases, that were
once seen as unique to, and governed by, property law, have now
entered into the more general realm of contract law. But of course this
only exacerbates the situation I am describing in which the special
province of property law becomes less and less apparent.39
In a sense, the basic Property course contains three functional
categories-first, there are cases and readings which set up the basic
question of what property rights are and are for, cases like Moore and
Pierson v. Post4" and Johnson v. M'Intosh.4 These cases are great
fun to teach, but students often want to move on from what they
perceive, and not pleasantly, as "philosophy" or "economics." Second,
there are the materials which introduce students to the arcana of estates
in land. Third, there are cases and materials whose subject matter we
contest with the other first-year common law courses, such as
Contracts and Torts, as well as with the Constitutional Law course.4 2
These fall in the realm of landlord and tenant, of private land-use

36. Moore, 793 P.2d 479.
37. 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985).
38. Neither Moore nor Ernst Pestana are included in this book. I am particularly surprised
in regard to the omission of the former, since it is a case in which the possibly conflicting rules
of the common law and statute are discussed, as are the cultural constructions which govern the
use of the body in law. For an interesting discussion of that aspect of Moore, see ALAN HYDE,
BODIES OF LAW 67-74 (1997).

39. I should also note that, when the course is cut from a year to a semester, one of the
things that often seems to be lost is the very interesting and teachable introduction to marital
property, which gets left to family law, and thus is learned only by those who take that course,
rather than by all first year students.
40. 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 204 (N.Y. 1805).
41. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
42. In regard to the latter, I think particularly of nuisance law, which often falls between
the two schools, and the tort duties of owners and possessors of real property, which most often
comes up in the context of injuries to tenants.
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controls and of public land-use restrictions, including the law of
takings. The truth is that, were we to leave aside the magic syllables
I referred to at the beginning of this screed, we have very little of a
plain case to make about our difference from other subjects in the firstyear curriculum. And so we cling to our magic, while knowing that
there is nothing in the first-year curriculum so generally thought by
our colleagues to be as dated, technical and trivial as the taxonomy of
estates in land and future interests.
But insisting upon the necessity of apprehending the difference
between a determinable fee and a fee subject to condition subsequent
is not the only way to deal with the problem. In fact, I think there is
also virtue in the vice of our inability to distinguish property from torts
or contracts. One of the things that makes Property fun to teach is
precisely the way in which we can awaken an understanding in our
students of the idea that property is value, and that value is socially
created.
I once heard Joan Chalmers Williams say in an AALS panel
discussion that there were no Formalists left in the law,43 except of
course first-year students. Nowhere is their formalism more on display
than in the Property course, where everyone starts out thinking that
property is precisely their relation to the thing, and that that relation
is one of complete control. We of course spend a good deal of our
time with students contending with that notion. Property, one says,
holding up a front-row student's casebook, is not what I have in my
hand, but is rather a network of connections surrounding it, connections that we have decided to make for our own reasons, reasons which
are sometimes in conflict and often far from clear or conscious. And
those connections, those relationships, limit our control over the thing,
require us to allow access to it in some circumstances, arrange the
possible dispositions we may make of it, and restrict its potential uses.
This central Realist insight is what is interesting about teaching
property law today.
That is what makes Property Law and Policy appear an attractive
text. It recognizes that the 19th century conception of property as
land, which is reflected in many current property textbooks, does a
disservice to the reality of nonphysical property. It also explicitly
recognizes that common law rules have been codified, modified,
supplanted and rethought with the result that positive law must be the

43. Similar words were used in these very pages last year in the Constitutional Law
Casebook Review issue. "No one believes in formalism anymore." Edward Rubin, Politics,
Doctrinal Coherence and the Art of Casebook Writing, 21 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 837, 838 (1998).
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practitioner's first, rather than last, resource. Moreover, the common
law is admitted to be a framework for policy rather than a set of
ancient rules innocent of social concerns. And property itself is seen
as socially constructed, while the social institutions that are developed
to govern it-"legal rules, social norms, markets, and political
institutions" 44-themselves reflect both the nature of the resources
themselves and the culture(s) in which they exist. This is a modern
approach to property, (or perhaps one should say, a Modernist
approach to property).
IV.

SUMMING UP

An approach that looks not only at common law, but at positive
legal institutions and legal culture, although attractive, may be more
aspirational than real. When we say a topic is common law, we
generally means that its decisional reasoning is based on analogy and
precedent. A positive law topic is one whose decisional course is
interpretive and relies upon an attempt to find meaning in, or give
meaning to, the language of the statute and perhaps (pace Justice
Scalia) to uncover the intention of its framers. To treat property law
like positive law is of itself a political choice about property and one
whose rationale the cases often do not adopt. While it is undoubtedly
true that the practitioner's work with property law is located within the
realm of statute and regulation, the notion that these are fundamental
to the topic, as they are to securities regulation or employment law,

say, is not always and everywhere accepted.4"
I think it is for this reason that, in the end, I found the material
less than fully satisfying. While the text includes statutory modifications of the common law, it did not strike me as focusing students'
attention on the choices which the statutes represented, as opposed to
the positions of the common law. Oddly enough, I think that
Dukeminier and Krier, though it makes no claim to a new approach to
property, 46 may be better able to direct students to a consideration of

44. DWYER & MENELL, supra note 6, at vii.
45. The Supreme Court in particular is attempting to reconstitute the common law of
property as a guide to the "muddle" of the takings issue. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
46. Dukeminier & Krier's aim, according to the preface to the First Edition is the very
traditional one of teaching "the complicated structure and functions of property doctrine and
something of legal method, legal reasoning, and legal analysis." DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supranote
4, at xxxv.
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the policy choices that are embodied in different modes of conceptualizing and codifying the common law.
A good example is the differing treatments of Sommer v. Kridel,47
a case both texts use. In Dukeminier and Krier, the note questions on
the case direct students' attention to the Restatement (Second) of
Property; 41 Powell's treatise, The American Law of Property; Judge
Posner's Economic Analysis of the Law;49 and The Uniform Residential
Landlord Tenant Act (URLTA),5" for a variety of positions on the
landlord's duty to mitigate by re-leasing if the tenant abandons. This
makes for a discussion in which the purpose of the common law rule
can be contrasted to potential and actual modifications by statute and
interpretation.
The review text makes the discussion focus instead on contract
remedies that may be available by statute or otherwise. This kind of
focus seems particularly unwise, for it is precisely by confronting
directly the tensions between the common law of property and the
statutory modifications, actual and potential, that bring property law
closer to other kinds of law. In that way, we can point out to the
students the ways in which property law reflects the contradictions
within our society regarding rights and ownership. It is only by doing
that, I think, that we can justify our old claims to "primacy ...in the
curriculum."'"
To sum up then, I applaud the book's pedagogic intentions, which
seem to me, as they did when I chose the text, a useful and potentially
instructive approach to property teaching, but am less pleased with its
pedagogic execution, that is, the way it actually teaches in the
classroom.

47.

74 N.J. 446 (1977).

48.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY:

(1977).
49.
50.
51.

LANDLORD AND TENANT § 12.1 cmt. i

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed. 1988).
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.208 (1972).
DWYER & MENELL, supra note 6, at v.

